ICSPP Newsletter

International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology

 

Special Fall 2004 Issue

 

            The Eighth Annual International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology Conference, entitled Critiquing Disease Models of Psychosocial Distress and Developing and Implementing Effective Psychosocial Theories and Interventions will take place on October 8^th, 9^th, and 10,^th 2004, in the Sheraton LaGuardia East, Flushing, Queens, New York. Outstanding, invited speakers include: George Albee, Ph.D., past president of the American Psychological Association; Mary Boyle, Ph.D. author of Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion?; Peter Breggin, M.D., founder and director emeritus of ICSPP, author of Toxic Psychiatry; Celia Brown, president of Mindfreedom.org; Joseph Glenmullen, M.D. author of Prozac Backlash; David Healy, M.D, internationally recognized researcher and author of Let Them Eat Prozac.; Bertram Karon, Ph.D., Researcher, Psychoanalyst and author of  Psychotherapy with Schizophrenia: Treatment of Choice; Diane Lambert, Ph.D. Researcher, author and educator; Vera Sharav, founder and president of AHRP: and Robert Whitaker, author of Mad in America. In addition, over forty outstanding scholars and practitioners will be presenting a wide variety of workshops and papers. (See pps. 21-27 for the full conference program.)

 

NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL MEMBERS TO COME TO THE AID OF ICSPP by Dominick Riccio, Ph.D., Executive Director ICSPP

 

As is evident from the roster of speakers above, this Eighth Annual International ICSPP Conference will be the most informative, energetic and largest endeavor we have undertaken as a scientific forum for the presentation of the truth about psychiatry and psychology and the whole mental health system. If we are to continue to grow and prosper as an organization and voice against the damaging effects of the global mental health system, we need to make this conference a great success. In order to do that, we need all of our members to attend and bring all of your friends and colleagues and students. We understand that it may be a great financial sacrifice to come to New York City and attend this conference, but we need you to do so. In order to make it easier, we now have the ability to accept credit cards and have extended the early registration date to September 15, 2004. Please register now! Don?t miss this ground breaking conference. Help ICSPP to forge new inroads in its efforts to influence public well being by disseminating the facts about the mental health system. Come and meet your colleagues and experience the community and solidarity that characterizes ICSPP, your organization. I hope to see each and every one of you on October 8, 2004.

DUES

            Many members of ICSPP are in arrear of their dues which for 2003 was $25.00. Dues for 2004 are $50.00 and are now payable. Our important organization cannot continue to function unless members keep it financially solvent. The costs of producing the newsletter keep escalating as do all others involved in maintaining the organization. Therefore, this will be the final newsletter for those in arrears. (Because of the proximity of this issue to the conference we have a declared a one time amnesty for those still in arrears). Please do not allow this to happen and deprive you and us from maintaining the vital link of communication that the newsletter represents. Important: Any individuals who cannot afford the full dues can send whatever portion they feel their budgets will allow

 

 

My Psychotherapeutic Caper  by John Modrow

Utilizing the ideas of Harry Stack Sullivan, Theodore Lidz, Gregory Bateson, W. Ronald D. Fairbairn, and others?as well as my own personal experiences, including both a brief schizophrenic episode which I underwent as a teenager in 1960, and the schizophrenic episodes of two close friends of mine (Paul, Randy)?I set forth my views on how schizophrenia is caused in my book How to Become a Schizophrenic: The Case Against Biological Psychiatry. (The book also includes a critique of the theory and practice of biological psychiatry.) Here I will describe my attempt to reverse the course of this disorder in one of my aforementioned friends (Paul)?a psychotherapeutic intervention noteworthy both in the results achieved and in the methods employed.

I met Paul in 1969 when we were both philosophy students. In 1973 I noticed that Paul was beginning to have mental problems which suddenly escalated into a full-scale emotional breakdown in the summer of 1975 after his girlfriend left him?a woman who had psychologically abused him. From that time on he seemed to have given up all hope of his ever achieving anything worthwhile in life, and he began to immerse himself in occult literature and mysticism. In May 1978, while living at his father?s home, Paul began to hallucinate: he heard voices and believed he had been contacted by the spirits of the White Brotherhood who told him he was destined to become a messiah. By early 1980 I remember him being in pretty sad shape. When I attempted to argue him out of his delusions, his response was: ?What would it take to make you believe? Suppose I were to turn everything in this room into gold?would you believe then?? He thereupon waved his hand as if he were a sorcerer and a crazed, triumphant look appeared on his face as he surveyed his room. ?Do you believe now?? he asked.

My aforementioned therapeutic encounter with Paul occurred in November 1982. Just prior to that time Paul had been traveling around the country on boxcars while accompanied by an imaginary companion?an ethereal, Athena-like personage who constantly gave him advice and instruction in esoteric wisdom. Once, when he was at a railway station in Portland, Oregon, his companion told him that if he would only put his arms around her and kiss her all his problems would be solved. He told me during our therapy session how he had hugged and kissed his imaginary companion in front of gaping onlookers at the railway station, and how his problems only continued to get worse. In retrospect, it appears that I had caught him at exactly the right time because at that point I?m sure he must have realized at some basic level that something was seriously wrong and that he needed to change.

That afternoon when Paul came to my apartment we reminisced about old times and I told him about my current projects. Though I would have the next two days off, I didn?t have much time to spend with him that afternoon because I had to work a night shift. I fixed a meal, made him feel comfortable, and left. Before leaving, however, I had shown him several jars in my bedroom in which I had been growing psilocybin mushrooms. When he asked whether we could ingest some of those hallucinogenic mushrooms I told him I didn?t think it would be a very good idea.

When Paul arrived at my apartment I was in the midst of doing research for my book on schizophrenia. By that time my attitude toward him had changed markedly. In reviewing my own schizophrenic past, I felt a lot more empathy for him. Yet, at the same time, I was a lot more detached. I no longer looked upon him as ?that madman? but rather as a fellow sufferer, as a fellow human being. When Paul told me that he was a reincarnation of the prophet Ezekiel I congratulated him and told him it must have felt wonderful to have been such an important person. I told him that I knew how he felt because I had been no less of a person than John the Baptist! I then began to reminisce about how wonderful it felt to have been John the Baptist. By that time I knew it was absolutely useless to try to convince him that his delusions were false or to try to psychoanalyze him. It only made him angry and defensive. So instead of psychoanalyzing him, I proceeded to psychoanalyze myself. I explained to him in great detail just how and why many years ago I had become schizophrenic. He listed intently to what I had to say. Like myself, he had always been interested in psychology. Since I was discussing my mental problems he wasn?t at all defensive. Yet in understanding my mental problems, I felt he was also gaining insight into his own problems as well.

I also explained to Paul the three-step process by which auditory hallucinations are caused: how the person will project his own feelings of self-disparagement onto the external world, a state of mind in which he imagines others talking about him; then how he will put himself into the listening attitude; and finally, how he will hallucinate?how he will hear voices because he expects to hear them. When I explained this process to Paul he admitted that he had always put himself into the listening attitude before he heard his voices?an admission that clearly showed he was gaining insight into his mental problems.

That night he told me about the invisible companion whom he had hugged and kissed at the Portland railway station. He also told me about a street philosopher whom he had met while he was in Portland who had introduced him to the occult theories of Rudolf Steiner. From there the conversation led to the topic of reincarnation. Sensing an opportunity to indirectly attack his delusion that he was a reincarnation of the prophet Ezekiel, I had him list every argument he could think of in favor of the theory of reincarnation. Then, one by one, I demolished every one of his arguments until he admitted that the theory of reincarnation rested entirely on faith and that people only believed in that theory because they were afraid of the permanence of death.

The next day I had Paul read an essay titled ?Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia? in which Gregory Bateson presents his double-bind theory of schizophrenia. Paul liked that essay for the peculiar reason that Bateson seemed to have utilized some of the concepts of Bertrand Russell who had been one of his favorite philosophers. After he had finished reading the essay, I asked Paul if he would help me play a practical joke on Randy, an individual whom we both knew.

I had met Randy in early 1974 when he was a member of a bizarre political cult headed by Lyndon LaRouche. About six or seven months later Randy quit the cult to marry a woman whom he had only recently met?a marriage that didn?t last long. Toward the end of 1983 (about a year after we had played our prank on him) Randy began to think of himself as a sort of avatar of Adolf Hitler.

In May and June of 1982, I lived at a rooming house where Randy also stayed. Also living at this rooming house was a schizophrenic man in his late fifties named Leon. Leon believed he was being harassed by a sinister person named Bernard who had thousands?perhaps even millions?of helpers whom Leon referred to as ?the Controllers.? Bernard and the Controllers made Leon?s life miserable. They would follow him everywhere he went and accuse him of being a ?baby raper.?

Randy held Leon in utter contempt. He laughed when he told me about the time when Leon went to a dentist and demanded to have all of his tooth fillings removed because he believed they contained electronic bugs or eavesdropping devices.

However, I found Leon to be a rather decent and caring person. He tried to be a sort of surrogate father to me, and it upset him that I appeared to be such an unhappy person.

I countered Randy?s derogatory remarks about Leon with extravagant praise. I told Randy that I thought Leon was a genius and that he was the only person who was stopping Bernard from totally dominating the world. As time went by whenever I saw Randy I would ask him when he was going to stop being such a gutless coward and join me and Leon in our struggle against Bernard.

I clued Paul in about my long-standing joke. I told him that I wanted him to help me validate Leon?s delusions for Randy?s benefit. At first Paul was reluctant to comply with my wishes. However, I assured him that all he need do was state that he had seen various individuals harassing Leon while I would do all the crazy talking. After I had received his consent to my plan, I called Randy at work and told him that an emergency had come up and that I needed to see him after work. Then I got in my car with Paul and drove 90 miles from my apartment in Bellingham to Randy?s rooming house in Seattle.

However, the joke was on Paul. Although his delusions constantly changed, one of his delusions remained fairly stable. This was his belief that he was constantly being harassed by a group of Satanists who were so internally dead and so totally devoid of any creative spark that they were full of envy and malice toward him because he was creative and internally alive. This was a delusion somewhat similar to Leon?s. My plan in talking to Randy was to describe Paul?s delusional system while using Leon?s terminology in an attempt to get Paul to view his delusions objectively or as something external to himself. (Paul, of course, knew Leon?s delusions were totally absurd.)

At the time we played this prank Leon was no longer living at the rooming house. Upon our arrival Paul immediately began telling Randy how he had watched Leon being harassed by several persons while he was at a mission in San Francisco. Randy, of course, was not impressed. He told Paul that Leon was the sort of person who provokes such behavior from others.

Then it was my turn to work on Randy. I told Randy that I was in telepathic contact with Leon, that Leon was a genius, but he needed our help in defeating Bernard. Then I launched into a description of what a terrible scourge Bernard was?how he and his Controllers virtually dominated the world. Then I began to explain how Bernard had affected my own life. With real anguish in my voice, I began to mentally undress myself?revealing all of my personal inadequacies, my failure with women, all of the humiliations I had suffered throughout my life, how my coworkers were tormenting me, my utter despair. Then I told of what a liberating influence that Leon had had on my life. Because of him I became aware of the fact that there was nothing wrong with me at all: it was all the fault of Bernard and the Controllers! They had caused me to fail with women; they had turned my coworkers against me! They wanted to destroy me because they were so internally dead and so totally devoid of any creative spark that they were full of envy and malice toward me because I was creative and internally alive. Yes, I could see everything clearly now! Empowered by Leon?s influence I now had a purpose in life: to find and destroy Bernard! Then I told them that while under the influence of the psilocybin mushrooms I had eaten, I had had a vision of Bernard as an evil monster who was so internally dead that he had to be put on a life-support system but who was still able to dominate everyone around him by means of telepathy and telekinesis. I told them with the help of Leon who was guiding me via telepathy we would find Bernard and would pull the plug on his life-support system!

After that last outburst Randy finally had had enough. He exclaimed that I had eaten too many psilocybin mushrooms and that I was completely out of my mind. No longer able to control myself, I collapsed on Randy?s bed and used his pillow to muffle my laughter?an unnecessary precaution since my crazy act had been so convincing that Randy interpreted my stifled laugher as just another instance of my psychotic behavior. Then, as I laid on the bed, something remarkable happened. Paul leapt to my defense and began arguing that Bernard and the Controllers were real! He kept after Randy like a pit bull. I could feel the tension in the room begin to mount. Paul seemed absolutely desperate?as if his entire worth as a human being rested upon his ability to convince Randy that Bernard and the Controllers were real entities. Finally, this spectacle became just too painful to watch anymore. So I beckoned Paul to come outside so we could talk. As Paul followed me outside he seemed very agitated. Once outside, I told him we had to terminate our joke immediately because Randy was losing his patience. But he didn?t want to quit. He said he felt certain that Randy was about to crack and that if he only kept after him he would eventually accept the reality of Bernard and the Controllers. However, I finally prevailed and we went back inside and announced that we had only been joking. With a knowing smile on his face, Randy feigned disbelief at the notion that we had only been joking and indicated that he thought both of us were really crazy.

When Paul came to my apartment I had no conscious plan or intention of doing psychotherapy with him or anyone else. It all happened spontaneously. I did it because I derived pleasure out of utilizing my knowledge, skill, and creativity. Likewise, my main motive in playing that prank on Randy and Paul was simply to have fun. That isn?t to suggest that I wasn?t making an effort to dispel my friend?s psychosis. Indeed, every aspect of my personality was involved in doing just that. However, I had no serious expectation that my effort would have any effect on him at all. So it came as a considerable surprise to me to find out that in that short period of time I spent with him that I had been able to dispel virtually all of my friend?s delusions!

I didn?t find this out until sometime in the late spring of 1984 when I was showing my friend an early draft of my manuscript. He looked over my manuscript and commented that I should have been a psychiatrist. Then warning me not to get a ?swelled head,? he mentioned the time when we were standing outside the rooming house and I had finally convinced him to terminate the joke we were playing on Randy. He said it felt as if someone had hit him over the head with a hammer and suddenly the absurdity of his delusions became painfully evident?and they vanished instantly!

?2004 John Modrow All Rights Reserved

 

Taking responsibility

 

Elina Baker, Devon Partnership NHS Trust, Craig Newnes, Shropshire County Primary Care Trust

 

This paper examines the assumptions underpinning the concept of responsibility. We ask how psychology contributes to constructing the idea of taking responsibility as no more than a form of being seen to act in socially desirable ways.

 

A patient on an acute admissions ward secretes a knife in her room so that she can cut herself; when the knife is found all her personal possessions are confiscated to prevent her from self harming.  When she becomes distressed, she is told she must learn to take responsibility.  Another patient punches a psychiatric nurse in the face because he thinks she is trying to poison him with medication.  He is put in seclusion and told that he must take responsibility for his behaviour.  Discharged home, a young woman repeatedly contacts her keyworker in a state of distress; she has a crisis over money, her boyfriend, her housing, her mother.  Her keyworker tells her that she must start taking responsibility.

We have often heard the phrase ?taking responsibility? used in such situations and have felt troubled by it.  In this paper we hope to further explore what it means when we ask someone to take responsibility and what the alternatives might be.

The nature of responsibility

We want to address the construction of responsibility by first examining two assumptions within which the concept of responsibility nests: the idea that persons (and their various characteristics) are continuous and the related notion that people can be meaningfully described in terms of stable (and internal) attributes.

The second author has recently written of about some of the consequences of a closed head injury and other injuries resulting from a car accident. The change in consciousness resulting from the accident raises questions about the confidence with which we assume that identity is continuous from day to day, whatever the interruptions. He had previously considered himself both reasonably concerned about the world around him and similar in this concern to others. Subsequent to the accident, things appeared to change: The wider picture evaporates. Global warming? Neither here nor there. Weapons of mass destruction? Irrelevant. British politics? Love Actually is more interesting. Sport? Who cares (especially about motor racing)? In this new world, environment is everything. People close at hand must be kind ? trains as timetabled, traffic wholly safe and stimulation not too complex. Health professionals must be on time or fear and self-doubt mount. Noise must be controllable (hypersensitive hearing is quite something in conjunction with spinal injury: scraped chairs and certain pitches of voice send the body into spasm, legs and arms twitching like lightning conductors). ? And life, even getting out of bed, is exhausting ?A lifetime?s assumptions about similarities between you and other people are shattered. The whole idea of consciousness, let alone shared consciousness, is challenged. One wonders how the world functions at all.                        (Newnes, 2004)

Assumed continuity (of the self, personhood, memory, day to day life, etc) is a given within much philosophical discourse (Murdoch, 1992). To fundamentally change someone?s circumstances through incarceration or psychiatric admission is not seen as affecting this essential continuity. Even when direct physical damage is sustained by an individual that damage is made sense of (by the individual and others) by reference to the ways in which the individual?s continuous personal characteristics have been affected or interrupted. Damasio (2000; 2004) sees these as an aspect of extended consciousness (his term) that he calls the autobiographical self. We do not easily admit to major personality change (selves are seen as, more or less, intact across time and place). We almost never consider the possibility that the changed person is so different as to make the notion of taking responsibility for previous action the equivalent of being responsible for someone else. We wonder what psychology would look like in a world where the self was not assumed to be continuous. Therapy would be irrelevant as people would not need to be accountable for the self they were seen to be yesterday. Sadness or fear would be met with assertions that there is no need to face saddening or fearful events or relationships from one day to the next; parenthood, marriage and friendship would have to face the lack of commitment inherent in the notion of the discontinuous self. We suspect there would be anarchy. Certainly the prison system and psychiatric system would struggle to exist if the idea of contingent behaviour was made irrelevant by the loss of any individual accountability for that same behaviour across time. (For a further discussion of ways of re-conceptualising the practice of psychology see Hansen, McHoul and Rapley, 2003; final chapter.)

At least one novelist, Carol Shields (1977), has no difficulty in challenging the assumption of continuous personhood. She opens The Box Garden thus, ?we change hourly or even from one minute to the next, our entire cycle of being altered, our whole selves shaken with the violence of change. (p.1)

Such a position is rare indeed in the numberless texts on counselling, self improvement and the more academically-inclined psychology end of the market.

Further, we would wish to criticise the view that responsibility is an individual attribute. Our position is essentially Strawsonian (Watson, 1987); that you cannot separate something called responsibility from the various attitudes and responses from which we infer that someone is responsible (Strawson?s ?reactive attitudes?). This position owes much to Ryle (1949): see, for example, his discussion of other mental predicates such as ?understanding? as public displays. Responses such as guilt, shame, pride, indignation and so on are subject to change as contexts change. Even allowing that persons are continuous across time, these attitudes will surely change with circumstances; such as admission to a psychiatric ward. To expect people?s sense and display of responsibility to remain undiminished or unaltered seems, to us, to expect too much. Prison guards and psychiatric staff are, implicitly, taking a position that emotions do not affect will, and thus, responsibility. For the psychiatric and prison systems, one can be responsible or otherwise, however one feels (arguments for and against this position can be found in Sabini and Silver, 1987; such arguments take up much of Oakley, 1992). Emotional reaction to, for example, being sectioned under the Mental Health Act, is not seen as relevant to responsibility and moral culpability other than in removing legal accountability for one?s actions.

Analytically inclined thinkers might go further. Riker (1997), for example, suggests that people should be held accountable for all that they do on the basis that their actions might be unconsciously motivated ? and as it is unquestionably their own unconscious, Jungian ideas on the universal unconscious notwithstanding, they can be held responsible.

If the mental health professionals involved in the (fictional) examples given above were to be asked what they had meant by taking responsibility they are likely to have talked about accepting the consequences of actions, feeling sorry and trying to find more constructive ways of solving problems.  They tacitly assume that the person is still capable of these things despite their admission or other changed circumstances. Such capabilities are seen (conveniently) to be continuous. 

Even within the definition typically used by mental health professionals, it is entirely possible that someone could engage in self harm and similar behaviours and yet still be described as acting responsibly.  When someone self harms, it seems likely that they have found a behaviour that provides a singularly powerful solution to the problem of expressing or coping with overwhelming feelings (Babiker & Arnold, 1997). They may also be prepared to accept the consequences, such as loss of blood, permanent scarring and even alienation from others.  It is only when they come in to contact with a system that attempts to control their behaviour that its consequences become unacceptable.  This is because the psychiatric response, through removing power and control, creates ?the very circumstances that are likely to have led to the need to self injure? (Johnstone, 1997, p.425).

There may also be times when violence represents a solution whose consequences are acceptable both to the individual and also to a wider society, in particular in resistance to oppression.  For a soldier being tortured in a prisoner of war camp or a member of an oppressed minority, the consequences of violent resistance may be aversive but they may accept them, given the already aversive conditions of their life.  Their resistance may also be approved or even applauded by the rest of their society or culture of origin.  For many users of psychiatric services the experience is one of oppression and violent resistance may be the result (Coleman, 1999).

In the first two examples, the person expected to take responsibility is detained under the Mental Health Act.  In the third example some part of the Act may well still apply, such as a guardianship order, (this will become increasingly likely if community care orders are introduced with the proposed reforms to mental health legislation).  This seems to imply that as a result of their mental disorder, they are unable to control their behaviour, and cannot thus be responsible for it.  Indeed, had the man in the second example killed someone because of his belief that they were poisoning him he would be found not guilty of murder on the grounds of diminished responsibility.  Under these circumstances a service user might well ask ?how can I take responsibility when you won?t give me any??.  This is an example of what Smail (2003, p.48) calls the ?paradox of responsibility?: being told to change and, simultaneously, that you cannot do so.

In the third example a person is told to ?take responsibility? for her own problems rather than contacting her Community Mental Health Nurse to ask for help every time something goes wrong.  Contacting a key worker at times of crisis can easily be seen as taking responsibility, by turning to the people who (apparently) are employed to help. There seems to be an attitude in a number of CMHT workers (including psychologists) that their job is to ?make themselves redundant? by promoting self sufficiency, rather than just being supportive. At all costs, workers must never promote dependency. It seems to us contradictory to dissuade users from asking for help at times of crisis and to encourage them to solve their own problems.  In describing what they found helpful about involvement from professionals, service users have identified the importance of continuity and developing a strong relationship as well as on-going accessibility and availability (Faulkner & Layzell, 2000).  Especially for service users with informal support networks that are themselves sources of stress, turning to professionals for help seems an appropriate and constructive problem solving strategy.

In order to be judged to have taken responsibility then, what service users (or prisoners) must do is simply what the system wants.  Although they may not be responsible for their behaviour, they can take responsibility for it by engaging with the system, through taking medication or participating in therapy, to prevent it happening again.  The subtext of the phrase taking responsibility is thus ?do what I as the more powerful person expects of you,? The apparent desire to get someone to take responsibility (or doing what they are told) may be more about conformity or punishment than helping them to lead a more fulfilling life. Smail (2003) further  suggests that a positive correlation exists between position in the power hierarchy, sense of personal virtue and a belief that the less powerful need to be more responsible.

Responsibility and social control

A psychologist working with one of these three service users might well set taking responsibility for their own distress and its expression as a therapeutic goal.  In achieving this they would also achieve the internalisation of the normalizing gaze (Foucault, 1977) which seeks to identify and correct deviance, as a form of social control. When a therapist teaches a client self-control, they are promoting a highly efficient form of social control: conformity that is imposed upon the individual by themselves.

There has been a recent move towards adopting a recovery based approach within mental health services, with an associated emphasis on self-management of distress. This can be seen as a welcome move towards allowing individuals in distress to use the strategies that are most acceptable to them, to take back control from mental health professionals, to genuinely take responsibility for their lives.  The Royal College of Psychiatrists? (2004) press release endorsing the ?recovery ethos? identifies as a guiding principle ?therapeutic risk taking to promote personal responsibility?.  Such a position appears to us to continue to suggest that the experiences and behaviour of people in distress are socially unacceptable and need to be controlled (Beresford & Hopton, 2003); this time, however, people must control themselves. Self-management thus, again, represents an internalisation of social control (see also Rose, 1999).  It seems to us ironic that, in industry, the best kind of management is a hands-off approach, allowing workers autonomy and space for creativity. Despite using the business argot, the self management implied by psychologists and others is a far more authoritarian affair.

Responsibility and power

The recovery approach situates the cause of distress, and the focus for action, within the individual.  Smail (1993) argues that concepts like responsibility that are used to describe the internal psychological operations of individuals, and thus provide proximal explanations for individual distress, function to divert attention from the way in which distress is caused by the operation of power in the social environment. It is thus impossible for someone to take responsibility for addressing their distress, as its origins are beyond the limit of their power.  For people sectioned under the Mental Health Act the position becomes untenable; their ?Get out of jail free? card (Holmes, Newnes and Dunn, 2001) has been played, they are deemed to lack responsibility and, in consequence, hospitalised. They are then frequently urged to ?be more responsible?, criticized for not ?taking responsibility? and so on. Beresford and Hopkins (2003) argue that rather than a recovery model what is needed is ?a rights-based? approach, involving policy changes to provide the support, public attitudes and access to allow service users to live the lives they choose.

In the examples given at the start of this paper there is a tacitassumption that the processes of admission and incarceration do not affect individuals? ability to learn (or practice taking responsibility as defined by the prison or psychiatric systems). Thus, living in entirely new ways (alongside prisoners or those diagnosed as mad, being labelled, having one?s day ordered by sometimes invisible authority figures and rule makers who one has not chosen; even through voting) is not seen as changing the person, or at least only as having socially desirable consequences. The extraordinary lack of power now experienced by incarcerated individuals is likely to mean that the new system will impact on them in both intended and unintended ways. How does one protest about ward rounds, prison warders, hospital food? ?Going on the blanket? during the dirty protests at the Maze prison is but one example. Self harm may well seem a powerful means of protest ? and an entirely responsible means ? if contrasted with a little used suggestion box or barely visible complaints procedure. If the consequences of actions are some reduction in privileges, this is likely to feel insignificant to the already experienced loss of freedom and autonomy.

It seems that what service users need to take is not responsibility, but power. A limited number of ways have been identified in which psychologists can promote this empowerment. These seem relatively weak when set against the forces of the established order: they include working with individuals and communities, enabling user-led research and taking political action (Smail, 2003; Willoughby, 2003). The Internet suggests innumerable opportunities for sharing information with the general public and thus improving informed consent for prospective service users (see, for example, www.shropsych.org). The psychologist working with the three service users described at the beginning of this paper could at least help them to become aware of the distal influences on their experiences and provide ?compassionate acceptance of who they are? (Smail, 2003, p.58).  They could refer them to a peer group, where they could experience support from and solidarity with others with similar experiences.  Equally they could write a paper to try and raise awareness of the issues involved.  Trying to address the power imbalance may be a way in which the more powerful can take responsibility for the lives of the less powerful.

If those in power have some control in the system (e.g., as psychogists working on in-patient wards), then recognition of Strawson? point is vital: if we expect people to take responsibility we must make the experience of their new environments as conducive to familiar  ?reactive attitudes? as possible. Adults used to being treated as adults must receive the same in their new surroundings. Condescension, criticism and worse will not provoke responses construed as ?responsible?. Simply telling people to be more responsible won?t help at all.

Acknowledgement

Our thanks to Mark Rapley.

 

References

 

Babiker, G & Arnold, L. (1997) The language of injury: Comprehending self mutilation. Leicester: BPS Books.

 

Beresford, P. & Hopton, J. (2003).  Recovery or independent living? Openmind, 124, 16-17.

 

Coleman, R. (1999).  Hearing voices and political oppression.  In C. Newnes, G.  Holmes & C. Dunn, (Eds.) This is madness: A critical look at psychiatry and the future of mental health services (pp. 149-163).  Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.

 

Damasio, A. (2004) Looking for Spinoza. London: Vintage

 

Damasio, A. (2000) The feeling of what happens. London: Vintage

 

Faulkner, A. & Layzell, S. (2000) Strategies for living: The research report. London: Mental Health Foundation.

 

Fisher, J.M. (1987) Responsiveness and moral responsibility. In F. Schoeman (Ed) Responsibility, character and the emotions. Cambridge: CUP

 

Foucault, M. (1977).  Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London: Penguin.

 

Hansen, S., McHoul, A., & Rapley, M. (2003) Beyond help ? A consumer guide to psychology. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.

 

Holmes, G.,  Newnes,C., & Dunn, C (2001) Continuing madness. In C. Newnes, G.  Holmes & C. Dunn, (Eds.) This is madness too: Critical perspectives on mental health services, Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.

 

Johnstone, L. (1997) Self injury and the psychiatric response. Feminisim and Psychology, 7, 421-426.

 

Murdoch, I. (1992) Metaphysics as a guide to morals. Harmondsworth: Penguin

 

Newnes, C. (2004) Diary. Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and Psychotherapy, 4, 2, 112-113

 

Oakley, J. (1992) Morality and the emotions. London: Routledge

 

Royal College of Psychiatrists (2004) Council report ?Rehabilitation and recovery now? points to new direction in service provision.  Retrieved March 26, 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/press/preleases/pr/pr_513.htm

 

Riker, J.H. (1997) Ethics and the discovery of the unconscious. New York: SUNY

 

Rose, N. (1999) Governing the soul. London: Routledge

 

Ryle, G. (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson

 

Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (1987) Emotions, responsibility and character. In  F. Schoeman (Ed) Responsibility, character and the emotions. Cambridge: CUP

 

Shields, C. (1977) The box garden. London: Fourth Estate

 

Smail, D. (1993)  The origins of unhappiness.  London: Robinson.

 

Smail, D. (2003)  Power, responsibility and freedom. Retrieved March 25, 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://www.davidsmail.freeuk.com/pubfra

 

Watson, G. (1987) Responsibility and the limits of evil. In  F. Schoeman (Ed) Responsibility, character and the emotions. Cambridge: CUP

 

Willoughby, C. J. (2003) Warning: Psychotherapy may damage your health. Clinical Psychology, 32, 25-30.

 

Address: 130, Abbey Foregate, Shrewsbury SY4 3RY

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

SEE YOU AT THE SHERATON LaGUARDIA EAST, OCTOBER 8, 9, 10 IN NEW YORK CITY ? LAURENCE SIMON, Ph.D.

 

________________________________________________________________________

 

                                                                                          

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OVER THREE DECADES OF ICSPP ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Stopping the worldwide resurgence of lobotomy and psychosurgery on adults and children, and all psychosurgery in federal and state institutions.

?        The creation of a federal Psychosurgery Commission by Congress (1970's)

?        Alerting professionals to the dangers of tardive dyskinesia in children (1983). Tardive dyskinesia is a potentially devastating neurological disorder caused by neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs.

?        Alerting professionals to the dangers of dementia produced by long-term neuroleptic drug use (1983).

?        Motivating the FDA to force the drug companies to put a new class warning of tardive dyskinesia on their labels for neuroleptic drugs (1985).

?        The withdrawal of a large multi-agency federal program to perform dangerous invasive experiments in inner-city kids in search of supposed genetic and biochemical causes of violence (the violence initiative) (early 1990's).

?        The initial cancellation and later modification of a potentially racist federally sponsored conference on the genetics of violence (early 1990's).

?        Alerting the profession to danger of down-regulation and dangerous withdrawal reactions from the new SSRI antidepressants such as Prozac, Zoloft, and Paxil (1992-4).

?        Monitoring, and at times modifying or stopping unethical, hazardous experimental research on children (1973-present).

?        Encouraging that NIH Consensus Development Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder to raise serious concerns about "ADHD" and stimulants for children.

While each of these critiques and reform projects was initially considered highly controversial, and while each was frequently opposed by organized psychiatry, most are now widely accepted as rational, ethical, and scientific. For example,

Psychosurgery is no longer widely practiced and not at all in state or federal institutions or on children in the United States; the multi-agency federal program aimed at using invasive biological procedures on inner-city children has been disbanded; the conference on the genetics of violence was delayed and then vastly modified; all experts now recognize the dangers of tardive dyskinesia in children; many researchers have confirmed that the neuroleptic drugs produce dementia, and experienced doctors now recognize the potential for dangerous withdrawal effects from the SSRIs.

      Become a member by mailing a $25 check or money order (U.S. funds) ($35 U.S. dollars if mailing address is international). Check or money order should be made out to ICSPP. An additional tax-deductible donation can be added, and would be deeply appreciated

 

Your Donations to ICSPP help!                

            Your membership in ICSPP covers the expense of producing four newsletters per annum and other mailings, and helps us to continue to respond to the hundreds of information queries we receive from the public, the media, and concerned professionals.

            General members receive the newsletter and the satisfaction of supporting mental health reform efforts for children, elders, racial and ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable populations. Members also receive a discount on the journal, Ethical Human Sciences and Services.

            We are a volunteer organization with no officers receiving salaries or other financial benefits.

            Become a general member by mailing a $50 dollar check or money order (U.S. funds) (60 U.S. dollars if address is international). Check or money order should be made out to ICSPP.

International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology

1036 Park Avenue, Suite 1B

New York NY 10028

Telephone: (212) 861-7400

 

Join US. Become a member of ICSPP today!

ICSPP is a nonprofit 501 C3 organization.

Name___________________________________________________________________

 

Title_________________Organization_______________________________________

 

Address________________________________________________________________

 

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City______________ State___________________________ Zip Code_____________

 

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NOW YOU CAN USE YOUR CREDIT CARD

 

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Signature:_______________________________________________________________________

 

 

Mail form and/or check to

Robert Sliclen, Ph.D

450 Washington Ave.

TWP of Washington,

New Jersey, 07676-4031

 

 

 

International & North American Offices

Peter R. Breggin, MD. Founder and

Director Emeritus.

 

Intl. Executive Director Emeritus, Advisory Council Member Ginger Ross Breggin

The Breggin?s address:

101 East State Street, PBM 112

Ithaca, NY 14850-5543

(607) 272-5328

 

International Executive Director

Dominick Riccio, Ph.D.

1036 Park Avenue, Suite 1B

New York, NY 10028

(212) 861-7400

 

United States regional Director

Lloyd Ross, Ph.D.

27 North Broad Street

Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450

Phone: (201) 445-0280

Email: Lloysross1@worldnet.att.net

 

 Newsletter Editor

Laurence Simon, Ph.D.

2717 Belle Road,

Bellmore, NY 11710

516-826-8860

lrsimon@optonline.net

 

Director of Communications

Andrew Levine, CSW

267 N. Central Park Avenue

White Plains, NY 10606

(914) 633- 1905

 

Director of Membership Services

Robert Sliclen, Ph.D.

450 Washington Avenue

Twp of Washington, NJ 07676-4031

(201) 664-2566

 

Intl. Consultant in Clinic Development

Kevin McCready, Ph.D.

3114 Willow Avenue

Clovis, CA 93612

(559) 292-7572

 

Editors - Ethical Human Sciences & Services: An International Journal of Critical Inquiry

Jonathan Leo, Ph.D.

Laurence Simon, Ph.D.

 

For International/National membership, newsletter, advocacy, and technical

information contact the international office. For regional activities contact the regional

directors and watch this newsletter for announcements.

 

CSPP Australia

Brian Keen, M.A.

Lecturer in Education

Southern Cross University

PO Box 157, Lismore, NSW, 2480

Australia

Phone: (066) 203797

 

CSPP Belgium

Philip Hennaux, M.D.

Medical Director, La Piece

71 Rue Hotel Des Monnaies

1060 Bruxelles, Belgium

Phone: 2-646-96-01

 

CSPP Switzerland

Piet Westdijk, Dr.Med. [M.D.]

FMH Psychiatry and Psychotherapy

FMH Child Psychiatry & Child Psychotherapy

Sattelgasse 4, CH_4051 Basel, Switzerland

Phone: (41) 61 262 22222

 

CSPP South America

Alberto Ferguson, M.D.

Av. 82, No. 9-86, Apt. 402

Bogota, Columbia, SA.

(011) (571) 636-9050

US address:

4405 N. W. 73 Avenue, Ste.051-5106

Miami, Fla. 33166-6400

 

Website: www.icspp.org

 

CSPP-Southeast

Barry Duncan

8611 Banyan Court,

Tamarac, Fl. 33321

(954) 721-2981

 

USA-CSPP Four Corners

Louis Wynne, Ph.D.

1420 Carlisle NE, Suite 102

Albuquerque, NM 87110

(505) 280-4400

 

USA-Great Lakes

Robert Foltz, Psy.D.

100 S. Atkinson, Suite 203

Grayslake, Il. 60030

(847) 518-9546

DrRobertF981@aol.com

 

USA-CSPP Mid-Atlantic

David Stein, Ph.D.

Longwood College, Psychology Dept.

Farmville, VA 23909

(804) 395-2322

 

USA-CSPP New England

Emmy Rainwalker

187 Merriam Hill Road

Greenville, NH 03048

(603) 878-3362

emmy@emmyrainwalker.com

 

USA-CSPP North Carolina

 

USA-CSPP Northern California

Diane Kern, Dr. Criminology, MFT

Insight Center

1372 North Main Street, #207

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

(925) 943-5503

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                      

 

 

 

 

 

CONFERENCE PROGRAM AND REGISTRATION FORM FOR THE EIGHTH ANNUAL ICSPP CONFERENCE

2004 Conference Program

CRITIQUING DISEASE MODELS OF PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS AND IMPLEMENTING PSYCHOSOCIAL THEORIES AND INTERVENTIONS

 

A THREE-DAY MULTI-DISCIPLINARY  INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PROFESSIONALS, STUDENTS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

 

SPONSORED BY

 

THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY, INC.

 

and AMEDCO, LLC.

 

OCTOBER 8^TH  9^TH AND 10^TH, 2004, 8 A.M.-5 P.M.

SHERATON LAGUARDIA EAST HOTEL

135-20 39^TH AVENUE

FLUSHING, NEW YORK 11354

 

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

                                                           

 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8^TH, 2004

 

7:30A.M. - 8:15A.M.                                              COMPLEMENTARY CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

 

MORNING SESSION:

8:00 A.M. ? 8:15 A.M.   Welcome & Introduction: Dominick Riccio, Ph.D. Executive Director  ICSPP  and  Conference co- chair

                                                                       Laurence Simon, Ph.D. Journal and Newsletter  editor  and Conference co-chair

                                                                       Peter R. Breggin, M.D. , Founder of ICSPP, Exec.Dir. Emeritus ICSPP

 

8:30 A.M. ? 9:30 A.M.    Plenary Session:               Presenter: Robert Whitaker, author

 

                                                                Anatomy of an epidemic: psychiatric drugs and the astonishing rise of mental illness                                                             in America

 

9:30 A.M. ? 10:30 A.M.   Plenary Session:              Presenter:    David Healy, M.D.

                                                  

                                                                Manufacturing consensus in psychopharmocology: the end of psychiatry as a                                                                           science?

 

10:30 A.M. ? 10:45 A.M                         REFRESHMENT BREAK

                                    

 

10:45 A.M. ? 11:45 P.M.  Plenary Session:             Presenter:  Peter R. Breggin, M.D. ,

                                                                                Founder of ICSPP, Executive Director Emeritus ICSPP 

 

                                                                Violence induced by psychiatric medications: cases, questions and contradictions

 

12noon- 1:30 p.m.                                                                                         LUNCH BREAK

 

                                                                            

 

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8^TH, 2004

AFTERNOON SESSIONS:

 

1:30 P.M. ? 2:10 P.M.    PAPER PRESENTATIONS

In order to gauge the size of the audience for each presentation we need each participant to indicate his (her) choice of presentation for each time slot. Then transfer your choices to the brief form provided after the registration form.

Please place an ? X ? next to the presentation you want to attend